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Abstract 
Train-centric Communications-Based Train Control system (TcCBTC) is a new solution for urban 
transit signalling. Compare to traditional CBTC, the on-board equipment is becoming more 
powerful and more complex. Due to its safety-critical nature, specialized technologies must be 
adopted to guarantee the safety of the system. To address the safety verification difficulty of the 
control logic for TcCBTC system, this paper presents an innovative topology-based method for 
guaranteeing the train control safety. Firstly, a railway network is described as a metric space, and 
then, topological spaces are introduced to express the movement authority (MA) and train trajectory. 
On the basis of the topological description, the safety rules are checked by performing a series 
computation of topology theorems. Finally, a case study has been carried out on a real metro line in 
China. The result shows that the proposed method strictly meets the safety verification and achieves 
excellent performance.  
Keywords: Train-Centric; Communications-Based Train Control; Safety monitor; Topology.  
1 Introduction 
CBTC is a train control system developed for the urban rail transit. It aims to ensure train safety and 
assist automated operations [1, 2]. Nowadays, the actual demands of passenger, operator and system 
supplier have started to move towards each other and meet at a point of system innovation. During 
the past years, a lot of works and research projects concerning the revolution of train control are 
sprang up all over the world. In order to address the future challenges, Next Generation Train 
Control (NGTC) project, running in the frame of the EU FP7 programme, develops the convergence 
of both European Train Control System (ETCS) and CBTC system by investigating the 
commonality and differences of system requirement for mainline railway and urban transit [3]. With 
the intention of enhancing the functionality, safety, and reliability of train control systems, a unified 
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architecture was discussed in [4]. A substitution concept of railway operation based on a centralised 
train monitoring and processing and control without the use of interlocking systems and without the 
use of light signals was introduced in [5]. So as to innovate the railway operation, some solutions for 
future train control system were also explored in Japan [6]. In China, there are also numerous funds 
and programmes have started to support the research on the innovation of train control technologies 
[7]. All these works show one of the trends of next generation train control system is that the on-
board equipment will undertake more functionalities, and the on-board equipment will be smarter 
and furtherly inclined to implement proactive safety. Train-centric CBTC (TcCBTC) system will be 
widely applied to urban lines with specific requirements. And this trend has been being put into 
practice in railway signalling industry, Alstom had delivered a TcCBTC system, Urbalis Fluence,  
for Lille line 1 in France in 2015 [8].  
In TcCBTC system, a number of additional  functionalities are integrated into the on-board 
equipment, thereby increasing the challenges and risks. The system is very complex as it includes 
hundreds of different hardware devices, software components, huge amount of data, moving 
physical entities, and an open environment. Unfortunately, such a complex design makes the system 
evaluation becomes difficult and time consuming. This is because the system safety properties and 
the control logic correctness are traditionally verified by different system testing and simulations. 
Generally, classical approaches have been applied to deal with the safety issue of the critical 
systems. For example, in [9], the Sobol variance-based method was employed to determine sound 
design solutions for railway system. Similar issue was addressed in detection and diagnosis of 
broken rail for railway infrastructure, where Bayesian networks was adopted to analyse the sensor 
data [10]. In [11], by using the simulation of railway environments, the dependability and safety of 
satellite technique application in ERTMS system was assessed. Furthermore, a coordinated cruise 
control strategy for high-speed train control was designed based on LaSalles invariance principle in 
[12] . Compare to traditional approaches, formal methods have become efficient ways to deal with 
safety critical issues in control system development since the 1990s [13][14]. Based on 
mathematical techniques, the advantages of formal methods for the development of safety critical 
applications are widely recognized in the railway industry. The standard EN50128 Railway 
applications for safety of software for railway control and protection systems highly recommends 
the use of formal methods [15]. Over the past few decades, a large number of formal methods have 
been applied in railway safety critical applications [13][16][17]. Haxthausen et al. provide an 
approach for constructing and verifying tramway train control systems using Domain-Specific 
Language [18]. Petri Net is one of several popular mathematical modelling languages for the 
description of distributed systems. In order to achieve high safety and high quality braking, 
Zimmermann adopt Petri Net formalism to model the safety requirements of real time 
communication and operation of train control [19]. Using Coloured Petri Nets [20], Barger and 
Bouali modelled and analysed the safety of ERTMS[21].  Werner Damm, et al applied a verification 
methodology for cooperating traffic agents covering analysis of cooperation strategies, realization of 
strategies through control, and implementation of control to European Train Control System [22]. 
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Pertinent work also was presented in [23], where model-checking technique was used to check the 
system specifications of ERTMS/ETCS. Wang and Liu presented a practice for the modelling and 
verification of train control systems in SCADE (Safety Critical Application Development 
Environment) [24][25]. In [26], Morzenti, A.  introduced an application of model checking on the 
railway crossing problem through SPIN. Based on the translation of TRIO formulae into Promela 
programs, the system properties were verified. A model checking technique for the verification 
process of railway level crossings in Europe was presented in [27], and the specification of the level 
crossing was written in a formal notation of timed automata. However, some gaps still exist between 
academic formal methods and application [28]. 
From the authors’ engineering practices, most of the ongoing researches are based on existing 
general methods, which do not perfectly response the train operation principles, and are inadequate 
to handle safety verifications for a complex TcCBTC system.  
During the past years, based on topology mathematics, the authors have made a lot of efforts on 
solving the modelling problems for the development of train control and railway signalling systems. 
A topology computational model of train movement authority under fixed-block signalling principle 
was presented in [29].  The train control logic was expressed by using point set topology methods. 
This method was extended to moving-block-principle train control system [30]. Furthermore, the 
point set topology mathematics was applied to railway interlocking system for online safety 
observation [31]. Essentially, these researches are based on discrete methods, and the train speed 
protection is not discussed. In this paper, considering the hybrid nature of TcCBTC system, the 
authors aim to establish a topology-based formal approach to guarantee the train safety. Addressed 
by topological space analysis, the train speed, protection curve and control logic are merged into a 
safety monitor. Additionally, a case study is carried out on a typical railway metro line, which 
evaluates the availability and performance of the method.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the safety 
issue of TcCBTC systems. In Section 3, a topology based safety guaranteeing method for train 
control systems is introduced. Section 4 describes the application of the method through a case study. 
Finally, Section 5 shows the conclusions. 
2 Safety issue of the TcCBTC system 
2.1 TcCBTC System 
A typical architecture of TcCBTC system is shown in Figure 1. Different from conventional CBTC 
systems [30], in the new solution, parts of the route control and interlocking logic functions are 
moved to the on-board equipment. The track-side equipment are simplified to the maximum extent, 
and the conventional Computer-Based Interlocking system (CBI) and Zone Controller (ZC) are no 
longer necessary.  
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 Figure 1  Architecture of TcCBTC system  
The system mainly consists of Automatic Train Supervision subsystem (ATS), track-side Object 
Control Unit (OCU) and the Vehicle On-Board Controller (VOBC). In a TcCBTC system, 
Movement Authority (MA) calculation, automatic speed control and train operation are 
implemented by VOBC. The train locations are determined by on-board measuring equipment 
instead of track circuits or axle counters. The data transfer is rely on continuous bi-direction 
communication between train on-board equipment and wayside control subsystems, ATS and OCU. 
Furthermore, the TcCBTC system supports direct train-to-train functional communication which can 
facilitate communication paths and achieve minimum information transmission times. In such a way, 
the track objects such as points, protection track sections preceding dangerous points and mask 
doors in platform are controlled by OCU, and they can be requisitioned via the communication 
between train and OCU directly. This makes the traditional interface between ZC and CBI sub-
system unnecessary. The ATS subsystem monitors trains, adjusts the performance of individual 
trains to maintain schedules and provides data to adjust service to minimise inconveniences 
otherwise caused by irregularities. Timetable information is transmitted to VOBC from ATS, and 
the VOBC requests the track-side resources to the OCUs according to ATS command to set the 
route for the train. As a large amount of information can be transmitted in real-time, the moving 
block principle is able to be implemented for train control.  
2.2 Safety Rules 
Safety has been defined as freedom from unacceptable risk [33]. Functional safety refers to part of 
the overall safety relating to the Equipment Under Control (EUC) and the EUC control system, 
which depends on the correct functioning of the safety-related systems, other technology safety-
related systems and external risk reduction facilities [33]. Compared with the understanding, this 
concept, is difficult to be implemented in practise. In railways, the safety can be interpreted as no 
occurrences of collisions between trains, no derailments and no danger to passengers, the public and 
the environment. Train control safety is a complex system engineering problem. With respect to the 
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principle and boundaries of the system, the safety impact factors for railway train control include the 
train state, infrastructure condition, control logic correctness, train driver performance, the 
maintenance work quality and the train operator skill. Overall, building a complete train control 
model is likely to be an impossible mission. Nevertheless, from the control system point of view, the 
safety is reflected in the control logic correctness under risk factors. In this paper, the authors focus 
on train control logic verification. 
Essentially, train control and protection are implemented by the calculation and management of train 
movement authorities. Furthermore, speed protection function is also considered to confirm that the 
movement authorities are being executed correctly. For a CBTC system, the train movement 
authority (MA) is defined as follows:  
A movement authority [2] is the authority for a train to enter and travel through a specific section of 
track in a given travel direction. Movement authorities are assigned, supervised and enforced by a 
CBTC system to maintain safe train separations and provide protections through interlocking.   
Due to the system specification and risk analysis, the authors abstract function safety rules of train 
control, which are described as follows: 
(1) Any device, infrastructure, or information that may cause danger to trains must not be used 
by the train control system as an available element for calculating the train’s MA, i.e. 
unlocked points or track sections, points with no position indications, unset routes, working 
area of rail line, and so on; 
(2) If any element within the scope of the MA for a train enters a state that may cause danger to 
the train, for no matter what reason, the train control system must adjust the MA within a 
restricted time and the element should be removed from the MA. For example, if a point is 
contained in the MA of a train and the point suddenly turns while the train moves forward, it 
may cause a serious accident, so the MA must be reduced to limit the train such that it can 
stop before the point; 
(3) Considering the worst-case influencing factors and failure scenarios, the train control system 
shall confirm that the train will stop in a distance equal to or less than that restricted by the 
MA. 
2.3 Schematic for Safety Monitor 
A formal verification technique allows for the desired properties of a given system to be verified 
based on the system function model through exploring all states of the model. Conventionally, the 
system function is modelled with a kind of formal method. The designers define a set of properties 
with the same method, then perform state space checking to analyse whether the properties are 
satisfied.  
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In this paper, the authors proposed a safety monitor which is developed based on topology 
mathematics. Due to the complexity of the TcCBTC train control algorithm, it is difficult to use the 
mathematics directly to model and verify safety rules for the whole system. In this research, the 
major challenge is to provide system engineers and software designers with an efficient safety 
assurance method. As shown in Figure 2, the safety monitor is implemented in a VOBC subsystem. 
The input of the model checker includes basic information for the MA algorithm, e.g. train data, line 
data and route states, the original MA generated by the train control algorithm, the speed and brake 
commands of the train. On the basis of topology mathematics, for the safety assurance model 
checker, the railway network is described as a metric space and the original MA for a train is 
abstracted as a topological space. The possible train trajectory = is induced from the two parameters 
of speed and brake command and then also expressed as a topological space. Safety verification and 
assurance of the train are done by means of executing some topology based safety property 
theorems. The output of the safety monitor is either a safe MA or a fail-safe command to the VOBC. 
 
Figure 2.  Schematic of TcCBTC safety monitor. 
3 Topology Based Safety Checking 
Topology is a branch of mathematics which talks about the properties of topological spaces and the 
structures defined on them. It can be inherently used to describe the railway network characteristics. 
Firstly, two fundamental definitions of topology are presented as follows, which are used as the 
basis of the method in this paper. 
Definition 1: [34] A metric space is a set X together with a real-valued function d given on 𝑋𝑋 ×  𝑋𝑋 
which satisfies the following axioms: 
D1.1a)  𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) ≥ 0  for every pair 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 and d ( x, x ) = 0 .  
D1.1b)  𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = 0  implies  𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦 . 
D1.2)  𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑦𝑦, 𝑥𝑥)  for every  𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 . 
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D1.3)  𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) + 𝑑𝑑(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧) ≥ 𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥, 𝑧𝑧)  for every  𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 . 
The first axiom states that the distance from 𝑥𝑥 to 𝑦𝑦 is nonnegative and it is zero only if the two 
points coincide. The second axiom states that 𝑑𝑑 is symmetric, the inequality which occurs in D1.3 is 
the so-called triangle inequality. 
Definition.2: A topological space is a set 𝑈𝑈 and a family of subsets 𝑂𝑂 is called the open sets of the 
space such that the following axioms are satisfied [34]: 
D2.1)   ∅ ∈ 𝑂𝑂 and 𝑈𝑈 ∈ 𝑂𝑂. 
D2.2)   If 𝑂𝑂1 ∈ 𝑂𝑂 and 𝑂𝑂2 ∈ 𝑂𝑂 , then 𝑂𝑂1 ∩ 𝑂𝑂2 ∈ 𝑂𝑂. 
D2.3)   If 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑂 for every 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 then  ⋃{𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖: 𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐼𝐼} ∈ 𝑂𝑂. 
The second axiom implies that any finite intersection of open sets is open. The third axiom indicates 
that 𝑂𝑂 contains all finite and infinite unions of sets 𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑂𝑂. The family  𝑂𝑂  is a topology defined 
on 𝑈𝑈, and the expression (𝑈𝑈,𝑂𝑂)  is a topological space, where  𝑈𝑈  is a nonvoid set. In simple, 𝑈𝑈 can 
be assumed as a topological space. 
3.1 Topology for Train Control 
In this paper, the train is represented as a simple point. And the railway network is composed of 
track sections from the train control logic point of view. Each section may contains an infrastructure 
component, e.g. point, signal, etc. or just a plain-track section. Two directions, ‘up’ and ‘down’ 
exists for train operation. As shown in Figure 3, a and b are end points of the section 𝑢𝑢. The authors 
use ‘1’ to represent the up direction, and ‘-1’ to indicate the down direction. 
 
Figure 3. Track section of a railway network. 
The authors choose the start point of the railway line in the down direction to be the origin of the 
reference coordinates. The section is denoted by a 6-tuple < 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏, 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑, 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦, 𝑠𝑠, 𝑙𝑙 > , where 𝑎𝑎 and 𝑏𝑏 are 
endpoints of the section, 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 is identification of the infrastructure, 𝑡𝑡𝑦𝑦 is the type of the infrastructure, s is the state, and 𝑙𝑙 is the locking state of the infrastructure which is contained by the section. The 
authors write  𝑢𝑢. 𝑎𝑎 , meaning endpoint a of section 𝑢𝑢. The value of parameters of a section unit is 
noted in Table 1as follows. 
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Table 1. Description of the parameters of section units. 
Section unit 𝒕𝒕𝒕𝒕 𝒔𝒔 𝒍𝒍 
Contains a signal 1 0 – failure 
1 – proceeding aspect 
2 – stop aspect 
0 – released 
1 – route locked 
Contains a point 2 0 – indication unavailable 
1 – normal position 
2 – inverse position 
0 – released 
1 – route locked 
A plain track section 3 0 – unoccupied 
1 – occupied by a train 
0 – released 
1 – route locked 
Then, a metric space for the railway network can be defined as follows: 
Definition 3: The railway network is denoted by a metric space  (𝑋𝑋,𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋) , for 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 , where 
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) = � 0         , 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑦𝑦                                                     |𝑦𝑦 − 𝑥𝑥|, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑦𝑦  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑               
∞�     ,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑥𝑥 ≠ 𝑦𝑦  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑   𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑                        (1) 
where ∞�  is a value greater than any distance between 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 in the space. The points 𝑥𝑥 and 𝑦𝑦 are 
linked means at a particular time, through the track sections and turnouts of the railway network, the 
train can reach point y from x. (X, dX) satisfies the axioms of Definition 1 and it is indeed a metric 
space. 
In a TcCBTC system, the VOBC computer calculates the protection profile curve required with a 
‘distance-to-go’ principle, based on the distance restricted by the movement authority. IEEE 1747 
presents a recommended brake model for the curve calculation [2]. The train's VOBC equipment 
monitors the speed of the train against the permitted speed limit. If the train goes above that speed, 
an emergency brake will be applied. Hence, the authors say that the train’s behaviour is directly 
driven by the speed protection profile curve.  
Equation (2) is a practical curve formula for VOBC, 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2
2𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒
+ �𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡1𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 � 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + �12 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡1𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡122𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒� − 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 = 0                       (2) 
where 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 is the distance that is limited by the MA, 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is the target speed, 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒  is the emergency 
brake rate, 𝑡𝑡1 is the safe braking response time of the system equipment, 𝑡𝑡2 is the braking build-up 
time, 𝑎𝑎 is the maximum acceleration. 
Assuming that the train goes safely at a speed under the protection profile, no emergency brake is 
triggered. Inversely, replace the target speed (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) with the current speed of the train (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇), the 𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 
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with the ‘distance-can-go’ 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔, then the authors can induce 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 by Equation (3). 
𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 = 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇22𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 + �𝑡𝑡1 + 𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡1𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 � 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 + �12 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡1𝑡𝑡2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡122𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒�                                 (3) 
 
Figure 4. Movement authority and train trajectory. 
As shown in Figure 4, the area covered by the “Distance-can-go” curve is called the train trajectory 
area.  
To verify the safety of train control logic, the original MA and train trajectory are abstracted as a 
topological space from the railway network metric space. The authors say that the metric space of a 
railway network is a continuous space. The MA calculation is based on interlocking routes for the 
train; it is a continuous part of the whole available route. As shown in Figure 4, the movement 
authority includes track sections  𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2, … … ,𝑢𝑢6, and the length of these sections is the distance 
for the safety braking model of the train. 
Definition 4: Let the track section sequence with order < 𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2, … … ,𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛 >   be the MA 
calculated by the ZC train control algorithm, 𝑋𝑋 be the set which contains all section units of MA, 
and a family of subsets  𝒯𝒯 , the topological space (𝑋𝑋,𝒯𝒯) is called a 𝑇𝑇1 space, which satisfies the 
following axioms: 
D4.1)   ∅ ∈ 𝒯𝒯 , {𝑢𝑢0} ∈ 𝒯𝒯 and X ∈ 𝒯𝒯, u0is called the start unit of the space. 
D4.2)   If  𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯 and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝜏𝜏 , then  𝜏𝜏 ⋃{𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+1} ∈ 𝒯𝒯. 
For the train trajectory, from Equation (3), the distance-can-go Lg for the train is calculated. The 
following topological space can be considered as the possible behaviour result of the train at the 
current condition. 
Definition 5: Let α be the location of the train on the railway network metric space, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 is the travel 
direction of the train, X is the set which contains all section units of the train trajectory and a family 
of subsets, the topological space (𝑋𝑋,𝒯𝒯) is called a V2 space, which satisfies the following axioms: 
D5.1)   ∅ ∈ 𝑋𝑋 . 
9 
 
D5.2)   if 𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎) + 𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏), then  {𝑢𝑢0} ∈ 𝒯𝒯, u0is called the start unit of the 
space. 
D5.3) let 𝜏𝜏 ∈ 𝒯𝒯  , for every 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 ∉ 𝜏𝜏 , if  𝑑𝑑�𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗. 𝑎𝑎� < 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 , 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 × �𝑑𝑑�𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗. 𝑎𝑎� − 𝑑𝑑�𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 . 𝑎𝑎�� >0and  𝑑𝑑�𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗. 𝑎𝑎� = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎{𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢𝑘𝑘. 𝑎𝑎): 𝑙𝑙 ∈ 𝐼𝐼 } then  {𝜏𝜏 ∪ �𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗� } ∈ 𝒯𝒯. 
From this definition, a topological space for the train trajectory can be generated, for example, in 
Figure 4, the space would be: 
 (∅, {𝑢𝑢0}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4,𝑢𝑢5}, … … {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4,𝑢𝑢5,𝑢𝑢6}) 
3.2 Safety Checking  
According to the definitions of 𝑇𝑇1 space and 𝑇𝑇2 space, based on topology mathematics, a safety 
checking method for train control is proposed in this section. Firstly, some fundamental concepts of 
topology are proposed [34]. A set 𝐶𝐶 in a topological space 𝑂𝑂 is closed if its complement set is open. 
A topological space 𝑂𝑂 is connected if the only sets in 𝑂𝑂 which are both open and closed are the 
improper subsets ∅  and 𝑂𝑂. From this, the authors have a lemma that the space 𝑂𝑂 is disconnected if 
and only if 𝑂𝑂 is the union of two non-void disjoint open sets. 
The following formula is for checking the interlocking state of a section unit: 
ℎ(𝑢𝑢) = �1 ,   𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑏𝑏𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎0 ,   𝑛𝑛𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎                                                                                                (4) 
where the interlocking state refers to 𝑢𝑢. 𝑠𝑠 and u.l , it is determined by the OCU in the TcCBTC. If 
the section unit is occupied by a route, then the state of the unit should be locked, for sections with a 
point, the point should be at the required position by the route. The value ‘1’ means that the section 
is safe for the train, ‘0’ means unsafe. 
Theorem 1: Let (𝑋𝑋,𝒯𝒯) be a 𝑇𝑇1 space, 𝑢𝑢0 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 is called the start unit of the space. There must 
exist a train with a location 𝛼𝛼 satisfies 𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎) + 𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏). 
It is immediately proven by means of Definition 1 and Definition 4. A 𝑇𝑇1 space is for describing the 
original MA generated by the train control algorithm. From the point of view of train control, the 
train must travel under a MA restriction, thus all of the MAs in the system must be generated for a 
particular train. This theorem will be used for checking the rationality of the original MA.  
Theorem 2: Let (𝑋𝑋,𝒯𝒯) be a 𝑇𝑇1 space, (𝑋𝑋,𝒯𝒯) is safe if and only if for every point 𝑢𝑢 ∈ 𝑋𝑋,  ℎ(𝑢𝑢) = 1 
is true. 
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In a TcCBTC system, an interlocking is an arrangement of infrastructures that prevents conflict 
between trains. Thus the state of all units within an MA should be proved to be safe.  
Theorem 3: If (𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴) is a 𝑇𝑇1 space, (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) is the related 𝑇𝑇2 space, (𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴) and (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) are safe 
for the train, then (𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴) must be stronger than (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) , satisfy 𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴  ≥  𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑  𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴  ⊇ 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇. 
Proof: Respect the definitions of 𝑇𝑇1  space and 𝑇𝑇2  space, (𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴)  and (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇)  are possible 
topological spaces related to the train, 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴, 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 are subsets of railway network 𝑋𝑋. Due to the system 
principle, the train cannot run out of the MA restricted territory at any time. Otherwise it indicates 
that the train may move out of the MA area, thus it is unsafe. Hence, 𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴  ≥  𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑  𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴  ⊇ 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 holds. 
Theorem 4: If (𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴) is a 𝑇𝑇1 space, (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) is the related 𝑇𝑇2 space, (𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴) and (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) are safe 
for the train, then 𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇 on 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 is the collection of sets 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇⋂𝑈𝑈 with 𝑈𝑈 ∈ 𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴. 
Proof: Using Theorem 3, it can be found that 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴  ⊇ 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇. Let 𝑗𝑗:𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 → 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴 be the inclusion map given 
by 𝑗𝑗(𝑦𝑦) = 𝑦𝑦 for all 𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇. Write 𝜎𝜎 = {𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ∩ 𝑈𝑈:𝑈𝑈 ∈ 𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴}.  Knowing that 𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇 is the smallest topology 
containing, since 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇⋂𝑈𝑈 = 𝑗𝑗−1(𝑈𝑈), if 𝜎𝜎 is shown as a topology on 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇, then the result will follow. It 
is observed that: 
(1) ∅ = 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ∩ ∅ and 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 = 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ∩ 𝑍𝑍𝐴𝐴. 
(2) ⋃ (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ∩ 𝑈𝑈𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∈𝐴𝐴 ) = 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ∩  ⋃ 𝑈𝑈𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼∈𝐴𝐴  . 
(3) ⋂ (𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ∩ 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗)𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 = 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇 ∩  ⋂ 𝑈𝑈𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1  . 
Therefore Definition 2 is completely satisfied, 𝜎𝜎 is a topology on 𝑍𝑍𝑇𝑇. 
To ensure the train safety, it is necessary to prove that every step of the train is following a 
movement authority and at any time the trajectory space should not include an unsafe point; this can 
be verified with Theorem 4. 
Definition 6: Let (𝑋𝑋, 𝜏𝜏) be a topological space derived from railway network metric. The authors say 
that 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 are Authority Connected (Au-Connected) if (when [𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏] is given its railway network 
metric) there exists a continuous function 𝜃𝜃: [𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏] → 𝑋𝑋 with 𝜃𝜃(𝑎𝑎) = 𝑥𝑥. 𝑎𝑎 and 𝜃𝜃(𝑏𝑏) = 𝑥𝑥. 𝑏𝑏.  
Theorem 5: If (𝑋𝑋,𝒯𝒯) be a 𝑇𝑇2 space, then every pair of distinct points 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 are Au-Connected. In 
this case, 𝑋𝑋 is a connected topological space. 
Proof: Let 𝜃𝜃  be the inverse function of 𝑑𝑑 ; it is immediately proven by means of Definition 3, 
Definition 4 and Definition 5, that every pair of distinct points 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 is Au-Connected.  
If 𝑋𝑋 is not connected, say 𝑋𝑋 = 𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐵𝐵 where 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 are non-void disjoint sets. Let 𝑎𝑎 ∈ 𝐴𝐴 and 𝑏𝑏 ∈ 𝐵𝐵 
and let 𝑖𝑖 be a function on an interval [𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽] with values in 𝑋𝑋 and such that 𝜃𝜃(𝛼𝛼) = 𝑎𝑎, 𝜃𝜃(𝛽𝛽) = 𝑏𝑏, 
then the sets 𝜃𝜃([𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽]) ∩ 𝐴𝐴 and 𝜃𝜃([𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽]) ∩ 𝐵𝐵 are non-void subsets of the separated sets 𝐴𝐴 and 𝐵𝐵 and 
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hence they are separated. Their union 𝜃𝜃([𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽]) is therefore not a connected set. Since the interval [𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽]  is connected and the continuous image of a connected set is connected, 𝜃𝜃  cannot be a 
continuous function. This shows that the condition is sufficient. 
If 𝑇𝑇2 spaces are connected, with respect to the Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, the 𝑇𝑇1 spaces are then 
connected. The Connectedness property is an important characteristic of 𝑇𝑇1 space and 𝑇𝑇2 space, 
Theorem 5 is used for checking the rationality of the control logic. 
Theorem 6: If (𝑋𝑋, 𝜏𝜏1) and (𝑌𝑌, 𝜏𝜏2) are 𝑇𝑇1 space for different trains, the railway network is safe if and 
only if spaces (𝑋𝑋, 𝜏𝜏1) and (𝑌𝑌, 𝜏𝜏2) are disjoint.  
Proof: It can be immediately proven by means of train control principle, let (𝑋𝑋, 𝜏𝜏1) be the space for 
Train 1 and (𝑌𝑌, 𝜏𝜏2) be the space for Train 2. If intersection  𝑋𝑋 ∩ 𝑌𝑌 ≠ ∅ , then it means that Train 1 
can pass through the area of space (𝑌𝑌, 𝜏𝜏2), or Train 2 can pass through the area of space (𝑋𝑋, 𝜏𝜏1). This 
must cause a collision between Train 1 and Train 2, hence it is unsafe.  
This theorem can be used for checking the potential collisions between all of the trains within the 
CBTC system control area, to ensure the safety of the whole railway network. 
4 Case Study 
4.1 Simulation  Methodology 
The case study of simulation considered in this paper is based on metro Line 1 in Urumqi, China. 
The Line 1 is currently under construction and will open in 2018. The length of the line is 
approximately 28 km long. It starts from Santunbei Station and ends at Urumqi Airport with 21 
intermediate stations. Based on the layout of Line 1, a TcCBTC simulation system has been 
designed and developed. In this system, train protection and operation functionalities are 
implemented in a VOBC module. With respect to the safety checking principle shown in Figure 2, 
the safety monitor is developed for the VOBC. To demonstrate the function of the safety monitor, 
the infrastructures state information is simulated by an OCU module. Moreover, the train control 
logic and train movement are also simulated in this case. The safety monitor and simulations are 
developed in MATLAB environment and the architecture of the case study is shown in Figure 5. 
The train receives a new MA from the safety monitor at each control cycle. To verify safety, the 
model checker requires the infrastructure states, the original MA that was generated by the train 
control algorithm and parameters from the train. Based on these input data, topological spaces are 
formed and safety checking is performed by calculating the six theorems presented in Section 3. In 
this case study, 5000 infrastructure errors, original MA and train parameters are set at random 
intervals during each train journey, in which all types of error in the TcCBTC system are covered.  
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Figure 5. Schematic architecture of the case study. 
To demonstrate the safety checking approach in detail, an example scenario is presented, which is 
taken from Line 1 of the case study, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6. A part of the railway network from the Urumqi line 1. 
where F2, F8, F6 and F10 are signals; 2 and 8 are points; 2DG, 12G, 8DG are track sections. In this 
scenario, three routes (from F2 to F6, from F6 to F8 and from F8 to F10) have been set for Train 1 
and Train 2. The detail data of the example scenario is list in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Engineering data of the example. 
ID Element Engineering 
data 
Start point(m) 
Engineering 
data 
End point(m) 
Contained 
infrastructure 
Topological 
unit 
Data construct 
0 F2 K8+226.000 K8+226.000 Signal F2 u0 (8226, 8226, 0,1, s0, l0) 
1 2 K8+322.000 K8+322.000 Point No.1 u1 (8322, 8322, 1,2, s1, l1) 
2 2DG K8+229.000 K8+341.000 Plain-track u2 (8229, 8341, 2,3, s2, l2) 
3 12G K8+341.000 K8+566.000 Plain-track u3 (8229, 8341, 3,3, s3, l3) 
4 F8 K8+563.000 K8+563.000 Signal F8 u4 (8563, 8563, 4, 1, s4, l4) 
5 8 K8+613.000 K8+613.000 Point No.2 u5 (8613, 8613, 5, 2, s5, l5) 
6 8DG K8+566.000 K8+634.000 Plain-track u6 (8566, 8634, 6, 3, s6, l6) 
7 F10 K8+637.000 K8+637.000 Signal F10 u7 (8637, 8637, 7, 1, s7, l7) 
8 Train 1 K8+221.000 /    
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9 Train 2 K8+605.000 /    
Note: K8=8000 m.According to the locations of the two trains, the topological units 𝑢𝑢0 need to be 
adjusted using  𝑢𝑢0 = (15580,15730, 0,1, 𝑠𝑠0). The safety checking approach can be divided into 8 
steps as follows: 
Step 1: Let the track section sequence of the MA that calculated by the VOBC subsystem be  < 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇2, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿05009,   𝐹𝐹1,   1𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿05019,𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶1 >   . With the respect to Definition 4, the V1 
space can be formed as follows: 
(𝑄𝑄1,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴) = (∅, {u0}, {u0, u1}, {u0, u1, u2}, {u0, u1, u2, u3}, {u0, u1, u2, u3, u4} )  and 𝑄𝑄1 ={u0, u1, u2, u3, u4}.  
Step 2:  Let the current speed (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇) of the train 2 is 60 km /h; the emergency brake rate (𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒) is 1.10 
m/s2; the safe braking response time of the system equipment (𝑡𝑡1) is 1 s; the braking build-up time 
(𝑡𝑡2) is 3.5 s and the maximum acceleration (𝑎𝑎) is 1 m/s2. Using Equation (3), the ‘distance-can-go’ 
can be calculated: 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 = 221𝑚𝑚 . According to Table 2, track sections LK05009, F1, 1DG are 
included in 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔. Based on Definition 5, the V2 space for the train 2 can be built as follows: 
(𝑄𝑄2,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) = (∅, {u0}, {u0, u1}, {u0, u1, u2}) and Q2 = {u0, u1, u2} .  
Step 3: Theorem 1 is used to check the start unit of topological space 𝑄𝑄1. From the adjusted unit 𝑢𝑢0 
and the location of the train 2, the authors calculate 𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎) = 𝑑𝑑(15580,15580) = 0 , 
𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏) =  𝑑𝑑(15580,15730) = 150  and 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑑𝑑(15580,15730) . Therefore, 
𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎) + 𝑑𝑑(𝛼𝛼,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏) = 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢0. 𝑎𝑎,𝑢𝑢0. 𝑏𝑏) is satisfied.  
Step 4: According to safety checking Theorem 2, for every unit 𝑢𝑢 ∈ 𝑄𝑄1, ℎ(𝑢𝑢) needs to be checked.  
Among sections LK05009, F1, 1DG, LK05019 and XC1, if any of the sections is occupied or 
unlocked, or Point 1 is not at its normal position, or Signal XC1 shows a green or yellow aspect, 
then ℎ(𝑢𝑢) = 0. That is, the safety conditions for the train 2 are not satisfied. 
Step 5: With respect to Theorem 3, the cardinality of V1 and V2 spaces can be checked. As 𝑄𝑄1 ={𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4} and 𝑄𝑄2 = {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2}, the authors have 𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴  ≥  𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑  𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴  ⊇ 𝑄𝑄𝑇𝑇. Therefore, the 
train 2 is in a safe situation.  Assume that the current speed (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) of the train 2  is 60 km /h; 𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 is  
0.466 m/s2;  𝑡𝑡1 is 1 s ; 𝑡𝑡2 is 3.5 s  and 𝑎𝑎 is 1 m/s2. Using Equation (3), 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 = 414 𝑚𝑚 can be obtained. 
Thus the V2 space for the train 2 can be calculated as follows: 
(𝑄𝑄2,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) = (∅, {𝑢𝑢0}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4,𝑢𝑢5}). 
𝑄𝑄2 = {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4,𝑢𝑢5} . 
Therefore, 𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴  ≤  𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇  𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑  𝑄𝑄𝐴𝐴  ⊆ 𝑄𝑄𝑇𝑇. That is, train 2 is not in a safe situation. 
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Step 6: Then Theorem 4 can be used to check the relationship between the space 𝑄𝑄1  and Q2 .  
⇒ {𝑢𝑢0} = 𝑄𝑄2 ∩ {𝑢𝑢0}; 
⇒ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1} = 𝑄𝑄2 ∩ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1}; 
⇒ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2} = 𝑄𝑄2 ∩ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2}; 
⇒ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3} = 𝑄𝑄2 ∩ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3}; 
⇒ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4} = 𝑄𝑄2 ∩ {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4}; 
Therefore, for every open set 𝑆𝑆 of the topological space (𝑄𝑄2,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇), there is always a open 𝑈𝑈 existing 
in the topological space (𝑄𝑄1,𝒯𝒯𝐴𝐴). Such a result satisfies the equation = 𝑄𝑄2 ∩ 𝑈𝑈. 
Step 7:  According to Theorem 5, if the train control is in a safe situation, then for every pair of 
distinct points 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 within the MA territory, the authors have that 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 are Au-Connected. In this 
example, the spaces 𝑄𝑄1  and 𝑄𝑄2  are connected with each other. Let V1 space 
𝑄𝑄1 = {u0, u1, u2, u3, u4}. It is assumed that there is an error existing (e.g. Signal F1 is displaying a 
red aspect), and such error is not detected by the ZC subsystem. In such a situation, 𝐿𝐿𝑔𝑔 = 221𝑚𝑚, and 
a connected space 𝑄𝑄2 cannot be constructed. Therefore, it can be identified that the MA is in an 
unsafe situation. 
Step 8: From Table 2, the V1 space for the train 1 can be calculated as (𝑌𝑌,𝒯𝒯𝑇𝑇) = (∅, {𝑢𝑢5}, {𝑢𝑢5,𝑢𝑢6},{𝑢𝑢5,𝑢𝑢6,𝑢𝑢7}, {𝑢𝑢5,𝑢𝑢6,𝑢𝑢7,𝑢𝑢8}, {𝑢𝑢5,𝑢𝑢6,𝑢𝑢7,𝑢𝑢8,𝑢𝑢9}, {𝑢𝑢5,𝑢𝑢6,𝑢𝑢7,𝑢𝑢8,𝑢𝑢9,𝑢𝑢10}). It is assumed that the V1 
space of the train 2 is (𝑋𝑋, 𝜏𝜏1) =  (∅, {𝑢𝑢0}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4},{𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4,𝑢𝑢5}, {𝑢𝑢0,𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2,𝑢𝑢3,𝑢𝑢4,𝑢𝑢5,𝑢𝑢6} ). Therefore, the train 2 can reach the unit 𝑢𝑢6 (the 
track section 3DG). At this moment, if the train 1 still located in 𝑢𝑢5 (the track section LK05021), a 
collision will occur. Therefore, it can be seen that Theorem 6 is used for checking the safety for 
different trains through the intersection of V1 spaces.  
4.2 Simualtion Result  
In total, there are 128 routes for the signalling system in Yizhuang line. In this case, 48 main routes 
are considered and 24 routes in each direction. Components of these 48 routes are listed in Table 3.  
Table 3. Routes list considered in the case study. 
Up direction Down direction 
Route  
ID 
Number 
of Point 
Number 
of section 
Number 
of signal 
Route 
ID 
Number 
of Point 
Number of 
section 
Number 
of signal 
1 3 3 2 101 1 2 2 
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2 0 2 2 102 0 2 2 
3 0 2 2 103 0 3 2 
4 0 2 2 104 1 2 2 
5 0 2 2 105 0 1 2 
6 0 2 2 106 0 2 2 
7 0 2 2 107 0 2 2 
8 1 2 2 108 2 3 2 
9 2 3 2 109 2 3 2 
10 0 3 2 110 0 2 2 
11 0 3 2 111 0 3 2 
12 0 2 2 112 1 2 2 
13 1 2 2 113 0 2 2 
14 0 3 2 114 0 3 2 
15 0 3 2 115 0 4 2 
16 1 2 2 116 1 2 2 
17 3 3 2 117 0 2 2 
18 0 1 2 118 0 2 2 
19 0 2 2 119 0 2 2 
20 0 2 2 120 1 2 2 
21 1 2 2 121 0 2 2 
22 0 3 2 122 0 2 2 
23 0 2 2 123 2 3 2 
24 1 2 2 124 1 2 2 
The case study is implemented by using a computer equipped with Intel Core2 Q9550 (2.83 GHz) 
CPU and 3 GB memory. The computer is running Microsoft XP Professional SP3 and MATLAB 
version 7.11.0. The scalability of the proposed safety guaranteeing method is assessed by measuring 
the checking amount of states and execution time performance as the number of trains increase from 
1 to 14. In this paper, there are 5 states for each point element are considered: 1) normal position, 2) 
reverse position, 3) normal position and locked, 4) reverse position and locked, 5) position 
indication unavailable. For a track section, there are 3 states: 1) occupied, 2) unoccupied, 3) error. 
For a signal, there are 3 states: 1) green, 2) yellow, 3) red, 4) error. Finally, a train has 3 states: 1) 
normal, 2) brake, 3) error. Figure 7 shows the real time checking amount of states; the numbers are 
collected as 1 train, 4 trains, 10 trains and 14 trains operating on the line. From this graph, the 
authors can deduce that the number of checking states is directly coupled with the number of 
elements within the MA; in other words, it relates to the route settings for the train. The maximum 
number in this graph shows that the state explosion problem of traditional model checking methods 
is not existing in our method. 
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Figure 7. Number of real time states. 
Figure 8 shows the performance of the safety monitor. The computation time covers the safety 
monitor, infrastructure simulation, train control simulation and train movement simulation. It can be 
observed that the average computation time for the one train operation is close to 5 ms, and the 
maximum computation time for 14 train operations is approximately 26 ms, which totally fits for the 
real-time requirements of TcCBTC systems. 
 
Figure 8. Computation time against distance and number of trains. 
4.3 Discussion  
In conventional formal verification techniques, safety properties are often characterised as ‘nothing 
dangerous will happen’, ‘bad things should never occur’, or ‘deadlock will never happen’. Due to 
the complexity and huge number of states for the on-board equipment of a TcCBTC system, it is 
inadequate for existing techniques to model it. Furthermore, the safety properties of the system are 
difficult to describe with current tools.  
In this paper, a new method for safety monitoring in TcCBTC systems is endeavoured to propose. 
Different from existing methods, the authors construct a topology based safety model instead of 
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traditional safety properties formalism. The safety model considers not only the safety rules of the 
system but also the abstraction of train control logic. On the basis of the safety model, safety 
checking is done by performing a series of topological theorems proofs. As shown in Figure 9, due 
to the abstraction of the railway network metric space and the topological space description for the 
movement authority and train trajectory, both the route control and speed protection functional 
components of the TcCBTC system are handled by the safety model. Therefore, the proposed safety 
monitoring approach can verify the train control logic for the whole TcCBTC system. 
 
Figure 9. Topology based safety monitoring for TcCBTC system. 
In real train control system engineering, the time cycle of the VOBC subsystem is typically 200ms; 
with respect to the performance result of the simulation, the safety model could definitely be 
integrated into the computing platform of the VOBC subsystem and could be synchronously 
executed with the train control algorithm module. 
5 Conclusions 
The method proposed in this paper is a novel topology-based technique for guaranteeing the safety 
of TcCBTC systems. The application of this methodology will contribute to achieve an ever higher 
level of safety integrity for such systems. Essentially, this method provides topological operational 
semantics for railway networks, movement authority and the train trajectory, which are used for 
creating a safety model for the TcCBTC system. Particular aspects of the safety verification of the 
train control logic can be implemented with a series of precise calculation and proving based on 
topology mathematics. Consequently, the algorithm of the proposed method can be integrated into 
the VOBC subsystem of TcCBTC systems. Compared with the conventional manual system 
verification, the proposed methodology has significant advantages in terms of mathematical 
certainty.  
A case study with a simulation model based on Urumqi metro Line 1 shows that the proposed 
method is suitable technique for guaranteeing the safety of TcCBTC systems. As the method 
originates from train control logic, it can be easily accepted in railway applications. Overall, the 
results of initial trials have been very promising, with a high performance of logic proving degree in 
the model implementation. 
18 
 
Considering the important results received from the methodology proposed in this paper, future 
research should be conducted to expand this model to other safety critical systems in the railway. 
However, the authors should also continue to improve the degree of automation of the method, and 
provide an easy to use development environment for system designers, which could assist the 
reduction of the system development cost. 
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